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SPACE TRANSPORTATION AVIONICS SYMPOSIUM
FLIGHT ELEMENTS
ADVANCED AVIONICS SYSTEMS ARCHITE_
SCOPE
The idea that an avionics system has, or should have, an architecture is a
notion that has come about slowly over the past twenty years. Avionic systems
began as individual controllers typically associated with individual vehicle
subsystems. As the controllers became based on digital technology, opportunities
for information exchange between subsystems increased because digital data bus
technology permitted the information to be exchanged without the degradation
associated with analog signal transmission. Vehicle subsystems became
integrated by sharing information to improve vehicle performance or to avoid the
expense and weight of duplicated information sources. The flexibility of digital
information sharing provided additional opportunities for changing systems once
they were constructed since all that was required in many eases were software
changes. The rush to interconnect digital systems has been somewhat of a mixed
benefit since system complexity grows as at least a power of the number of
connections and perhaps exponentially. Even the accounting task of tracking
information sources and users can become formidable. A result has traditionally
been that the supposedly "free" information exchange resource becomes choked
trying to accommodate the transmission requirements imposed after the system
has been constructed. All too often systems are designed using the best
engineering judgement and then bludgeoned into submission on the laboratory
floor. There is the question of organizational responsibility when subsystems that
have been the responsibility of separate organizations become interdependent.
For example, it is feasible to use the high-quality rate information from
inertial platforms, historically a navigation function, to stabilize the vehicle, a
control function with much higher reliability requirement. Which organization
controls the platform? There are many such new questions that come about as
traditional boundaries between subsystems break down and the vehicle itself
becomes the boundary. It is not now feasible to address all questions that can be
raised as a result of attempting to design integrated system architectures. An
appropriate limitation of the scope of this topic is to consider the avionic flight
system as the substrate upon which the applications are built, and as such, must
support airborne, and one-time ground functions such as guidance and control,
health monitoring, ground maintenance diagnostics, etc. If a sufficiently good
understanding of the capabilities and limitations of a useful class of architectures
and their requirements can be obtained such that it is feasible to make sound
engineering decisions before fabrication, that would be a reasonable and useful
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goal. The study of digital avionics system architectures is just being accepted as a
separate topic. Fault-tolerance is an aspect of systems architecture that, while it
may appear to be a cure-all for system failure, has many subtleties that limit its
effectiveness. Some important concepts have been identified such as system
synchronization and protection against inconsistent data distribution, but a
general theoretical framework for system architectures is a future goal.
OBJECTIVES
Space transportation objectives are associated with transporting materiel from
Earth to orbit, interplanetary travel and planetary landing. The objectives
considered here are associated primarily with Earth to orbit transportation. Many
good avionics architectural features will support all phases of space
transportation, but interplanetary transportation poses significantly different
problems such as long mission times with high-reliability, unattended operation,
and significantly different opportunities such as long non-operational flight
segments that can be used for equipment fault diagnosis and repair. Although it
is not further considered in this write-up, the maintenance of system operation
for long mission times is a "hole" in current research since fault-tolerance does no
good if the underlying physical devices do not exhibit some minimal reliability for
the entire mission. With the trend toward smaller geometries and new physical
technologies, it is quite likely that heretofore unimportant failure modes will
become dominant over long mission times. Avionic systems that are used in the
Earth to orbit scenario can be years in production and months in assembly and
checkout on the launch pad. The system life culminates in a ten minute operation
with some factors such as acceleration, vibration and temperature dramatically
different from anything previously encountered other than during system
qualification in the qualification laboratory. The launches tend to be infrequent
and very expensive with very expensive payloads. They involve hundreds of
launch site personnel servicing a vehicle, using complex scheduling to allow each
subsystem expert time in the very limited area around the vehicle. When the
vehicle is ready, the launch is subject to the vagaries of the weather and to the
pressures of fixed launch windows. Avionics systems for launch vehicles should
be designed and fabricated to support worthwhile goals such as low recurring
hardware and operations cost, launch on demand, flexible and secure interfaces
for payloads and other integrated non=avionics systems, and be open ended to
grow and change within the relatively long service life of launch vehicles. Some
specific objectives for launch vehicle architectures should be selected to achieve
improved reliability at lower cost. Fault-tolerance can be used to permit
continued operation with faulty units, not only during launch but also, and
perhaps with more impact, during pre=launch activities. Completing subsystem
tests without stand=down for avionic systems repair can save facility and
personnel time that is much more expensive than the electronics. This will be
especially beneficial because, except for the factors noted above, the avionic
system operates at rated performance during system checkout, which may take
weeks, and may even support factory assembly and health monitoring for
months. Ground operations can be stressful in ways different from the launch.
For example, ground temperature stress can vary greatly and be sustained for
much longer than flight stress. Also, work on other systems can inadvertently
stress the avionics and vice versa. Launching the vehicle with faults is
problematical since the idea of committing an expensive vehicle to launch with an
inexpensive part failed will require a cultural change within the launch vehicle
community. If acceptable criteria can be established, vehicle life-cycle costs can
be lowered by permitting launch with faults. Another beneficial specific objective
is to design avionics subsystems to go from factory to flight without calibration or
other adjustments. Suitable internal diagnostics and criteria must be provided to
permit satisfactory operation to be confirmed by launch site personnel and to
allow ease of fault isolation, change-out and retest in case of failure. As principles
of system architecture design become established through research, these should
be applied to all avionic systems across the entire vehicle from sensor to effector
to provide a uniform basis for measuring avionic system performance through
such features as common interfaces and subsystem redundancy management
procedures. The specific physical technologies may be different for different
functions, for example the engine controller may require high temperature
electronics, but the underlying elements for functions such as synchronization
and redundancy management could be uniform over the entire avionic system.
Diagnostic routines and architecture modeling would then provide detailed insight
into avionic system health. Since the avionic systems are becoming more capable
and are not the time or cost drivers for checkout, they will have to aid the
diagnostics and integration for other subsystems. An important objective in this
case will be to establish the avionic system capability to accommodate perhaps
thousands of measurements and hundreds of control functions. This implies a
large quantity of data, even if individual measurement is taken at a low data rate.
On-demand subsystem health data has been suggested as a means to gather data
from subsystems when significant changes occur, thus reducing the background
data rate to a low level. This approach may be beneficial when subsystem events
occur at random, but a global event such as a lightning upset could cause many
subsystems to try to report the event simultaneously causing data overload.
SIGNIFICANT RESEARCH ACTIVITIES
The most significant recent research activity targeted at launch vehicle avionics
has been the Advanced Launch System (ALS) Advanced Development program.
The Advanced Launch System is conceived to be a series of medium to large
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launch vehicles with the common characteristic that the cost of placing a pound of
payload in orbit will be roughly an order of magnitude less than the Titan IV
reference-mission cost. In order to meet this goal, it is proposed to utilize
advanced, fault-tolerant avionics to support concepts such as knowledge-based
system diagnostics for autonomous pre-launch checkout and advanced guidance
and control to permit launches in a wider variety of weather conditions than are
now possible. The ALS program has, under the title of Multi-path Redundant
Avionic Systems (MPRAS) leveraged on-going research efforts at both NASA and
Air Force laboratories to develop the required launch vehicle systems. One such
effort is being conducted at The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory (CSDL) as the
NASA-sponsored Advanced Information Processing System (AIPS). The AIPS
program is developing technology that will apply to a wide variety of system
needs. It embodies the latest concepts for achieving fault tolerance, graded to be
appropriate to the individual function being performed and is designed to be
validated to the required reliability and performance. The AIPS concept is
illustrated in figure 1 and embodies the advanced architectural concepts that will
be covered in the section on technology issues. Another MPRAS effort is being
conducted at Boeing Aerospace and is leveraging the Integrated Fault-Tolerant
Avionic System (IFTAS, figure 2) to provide capabilities similar to those of the
AIPS. A third MPRAS effort is underway at General Dynamics Space Systems,
leveraged from Air Force Pave Pillar avionics concepts as illustrated in figure 3.
Martin Marietta is developing a large laboratory with a focus on developing
reliable, fault-tolerant systems for launch vehicles. The Space Station Freedom
data management system architecture illustrated in figure 4 shows a point design
with many fault-tolerance features. A significant source of fault-tolerant avionics
experience can be found in aircraft systems. Aircraft systems have not labored
under the extreme weight sensitivity and reluctance to technological change of
most launch vehicle avionics systems (Shuttle is one exception), so that
redundancy has for many years been an accepted way to accommodate aircraft
system faults. Both in civilian and military aircraft systems, redundant, fault-
tolerant avionics have been successfully used in the operational environment of
scheduled arrivals and departures to which the space transportation community
aspires. The consequences of aircraft avionics system failure are typically not
catastrophic, although both commercial and military systems are close to being
used for full-time, flight-critical functions where system failure would have the
same catastrophic impact as a launch vehicle system failure. All of the major U.S.
airframe manufacturers have, in partnership with avionics manufacturers, fielded
fault-tolerant avionic systems for high reliability applications, most notably for
autoland where the autoland function is critical for up to a minute of flight just
prior to touchdown. Fault-tolerance for single function applications appears
reasonably well accepted, but the aircraft systems designers are still wrestling
with the problem of designing vehicle-wide avionic systems that are manageable
and exhibit sufficiently long time between maintenance. Advanced vehicle-wide
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architectures for military applications are being pursued at Wright Research and
Development Center under the Pave Pillar and Pave Pace programs which feature
very high performance architectural elements to support various fault tolerance
strategies and which are being rendered into hardware using a common module
approach to promote lower production and maintenance costs. Honeywell has for
a number of years been developing the concept of self-checking pairs to achieve
high fault detection coverage for processors, buses and the checkers themselves.
This concept is illustrated in figure 5. Self checking pairs is one of the main
features MPRAS has defined to enhance Pave Pillar designs. There has been
recently renewed interest in protection of avionic hardware from electromagnetic
disturbances from natural causes such as lightning or man made high energy
radio frequency emissions. This aspect of avionic system design is being most
visibly pursued by Honeywell although it is a recognized problem within the
aerospace industry. Launch vehicle launch-on-demand capabilities are somewhat
dependent on lightning hardness to minimize the need to avoid lightning strikes
during ascent. Transients from other, less well defined sources can cause faults in
the form of single event upsets that, although they cause no permanent damage,
can alter the performance of avionic systems in harmful ways. In addition to
these efforts many universities have significant results that can be incorporated
into the design and testing of fault-tolerant avionic systems. Table 1 is a list of
organizations known to have significant efforts in fault tolerant avionic systems.
Most aerospace companies now have more than a passing interest in fault tolerant
systems since their use has become pervasive in flight vehicles. Table 2 lists
some of the more prominent periodical publications and conferences where
technical discussions of advanced avionics are to be found.
TECHNOLOGY ISSUF__
Avionic system architecture impacts and is impacted by virtually everything
within the vehicle since the digital systems are increasingly used to integrate the
activities of vehicle subsystems to achieve performance unattainable with more
traditional engineering approaches. The capability of digital avionics, with logic
unfettered by the laws of physics, to direct otherwise mundane systems to
perform brilliantly in concert is a powerful reason to employ such systems.
Unfortunately, the same logic that can correctly find the few ways to make things
go right can also make things go wrong in an almost infinite number of ways. The
unimaginable complexity of digital systems cannot in general be managed by
appeals to physical properties since they are designed out of practical
consideration by the nature of the digital logic. Correct design of digital systems
is a technology issue that becomes increasingly difficult to manage with the trend
toward distributed, fault-tolerant systems. Since most fault-tolerant architectures
use replicated, identical elements to protect against random physical failures, a
design flaw becomes a generic failure for the entire system. The systems can be
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modeled as an aid to understanding but testing alone cannot be used for system
validation because of the large state spaces that must be tested. Fault-tolerance
brings with it the possibility of reducing the failure probability of avionics
systems to a negligible amount. However, once the more prominent failure modes
have been covered using fault-tolerance, other failure modes become important
and they are generally much more subtle and hard to identify, much less
quantify. The reliability of the fault-tolerant system becomes almost totally
dependent on the fault-tolerance mechanism. This is especially true of
reconfigurable fault-tolerant systems since the reconfiguration mechanism can
disable good units in response to unexpected inputs or its own internal faults.
Therefore, design correctness and a comprehensive accounting of all possible
inputs and actions are of paramount importance.
As the digital processing and bus capability keep expanding, and volume per
MIPS shrinks, the feasibility and benefit of more integrated non-avionic systems
has also increased. The mix of computation and input/output is changing such
that I/O accounts for an estimated 75 percent of the avionic system and an even
greater portion of system unreliability and cost, because the I/O must service a
variety of subsystems and cannot be made as uniform and modular as the
computation system. The technology to support effective and efficient
input/output design and validation is a new and different area for the avionic
systems technologist.
Software development for avionics systems is a critical issue because of the
special need for correctness of the system software. There is much less
opportunity to check the correctness of system software because the totally
logical aspects of digital systems typically have fewer independent correctness
criteria to check against. There is also less time to do checking because the
system software must be executed more often than application software.
Software development environments and languages must be tailored to support
system as well as application development. Architectures that are based on
combinations of a small number of well understood building blocks offer a means
to limit complexity, but the utility of such approaches has yet to be demonstrated.
Space systems traditionally use single string systems with individual components
qualified to the highest levels. Whether a less costly system of higher reliability
can be assembled using lower reliability parts is an issue currently under
examination both from technological and cultural standpoints. Aircraft systems
used in commercial or military operational situations can be dispatched with a
given number of faults, and this is a key to practical systems utilization since it is
exceedingly difficult to achieve a perfect operational state, especially where the
systems must be serviced and maintained by personnel who are not experts
dedicated to particular hardware items. Hardening avionic systems against
external electromagnetic disturbances and random transients is a difficult
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problem since the electromagnetic threats and random transients have not been
completely characterized for all threat sources. The effects of transients and
electromagnetic disturbances on digital systems are difficult to characterize since
they are less well contained than the isolated one-at-a-time faults that traditional
fault-tolerance schemes protect against.
SUMMARY
Avionics systems are entering a phase of development where the traditional
approaches to satisfactory systems based on engineering judgement and thorough
testing will alone no longer be adequate to assure that the required system
performance can be obtained. A deeper understanding will be required to make
the effects of obscure design decisions clear at a level where their impact can be
properly judged. This deeper understanding will be provided by tools and
techniques that are just now being developed in research laboratories. Digital
avionics systems will increasingly be the means by which many of the U.S. space
goals will be accomplished. Now is an opportune time for the space vehicle
community to step up to placing advanced, fault-tolerant avionic systems into
general use by building on the experience of the aircraft industry supplemented
by a fresh look at the tools and techniques for designing, fabricating and testing
complex avionics systems.
Table 1
Organizations and Contacts
Organization Contact
NASA Langley Research Center Charles Meissner
Felix Pitts
NASA Johnson Spaceflight Center Tom Barry
J. T. Edge
C. S. Draper Laboratory Jay Lala
John Deyst
Honeywell Systems Research Center Mark Jeppson
Honeywell Commercial Flight Systems Richard Hess
Larry Yount
General Dynamics Space Systems John Karas
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Table 1 (concluded)
Martin Marietta Astronautics Group
Boeing Aerospace
Lockheed/S anders
Wright Research and Dev. Center
Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Aerospace Corporation
Allied Signal ATC
UCLA
Fail Safe Technology
Robert Gates
Don Johnson
Raymond Garbos
Ron Szkody
Raymond Bortner
Jeff Stanley
David Rennels
George Gilley
Chris Walter
Algirdas Avizienis
Mike Seavers
Table 2
conferences and Periodicals
Conference/Periodical SponsQr
Digital Avionics System Conference IEEE
AIAA
Computers in Aerospace .Conference AIAA
IEEE
Fault Tolerant Computing Symposium IEEE
Reliability and Maintainability symposium
National Aerospace Electronics Conference IEEE
IEEE Transactions on Reliability
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